Gnaeus Pompey Magnus was undoubtedly one of the most influential figures during the Roman Republic in both political and military spheres. He was designated three times consul, winning battles in Asia, Europe, and Africa. His remarkable military intelligence made him seen by his contemporaries as a leader comparable to Alexander the Great. Pompey became immensely popular during the First Civil War of the Republic (88-81 BC), being loyal to Gnaeus Cornelius Sulla during his campaign in Italy, and earning unconditional favor from him (Amela Valverde, 2003, pp. 9-11). Although he never officially exercised as a dictator, during his third consulship (52 BC), a series of circumstances led the Senate to partially revive this ancient magistracy. In this article, parallels will be developed between this consulship designated by the Senate as “sine collega” and traditional Roman dictatorship.
Context
Pompey ascended to the highest spheres of Roman politics thanks to his achievements and recognition in battle, putting an end to the long war with Sertorius and the slave rebellion led by Spartacus. For these merits, he obtained his first consulship in 70 BC alongside Marcus Licinius Crassus. However, obtaining this magistracy was unusual, as Pompey ascended to the highest responsibility of the Republic without having held any previous magistracies. Thus, his election was largely due to the already mentioned military successes he had throughout his career (Amela Valverde, 2003, pp. 93-94).
His second consulship was in 55 BC. However, the events we are discussing place us in the year 52 BC, when Rome was immersed in a deep political crisis as a result of a series of misfortunes. First, the republican system suffered from enormous decay, as candidates and consuls were involved in corruption schemes during the consular elections of 53 BC, indicating a clear weariness of the political system. In fact, at the beginning of the year there were no active consuls, which led to the appointment of successive interreges. This instability was compounded by a grain crisis that prevented proper supply for the city (Amela Valverde, 2003, p. 217).
In such circumstances, rumors began circulating among the population that Pompey would be appointed dictator to restore order in the Republic. It was the tribune of the plebs Gaius Lucinius Hirro who openly proposed this appointment. Pompey initially rejected the position and insisted on holding consular elections (Plut. Pomp. 54). Despite this, anarchy and civil conflicts proliferated in the streets following the assassination of Senator Publius Clodius Pulcher by Titus Annius Milo, a candidate for consulship in 52 BC. This event generated a definitive public opinion to grant extraordinary powers to Pompey, whether under the figure of dictator or as sole consul (Amela Valverde, 2003, pp. 220-221).
Pompey, consul sine collega
The idea of a new dictatorship in Rome was unfeasible due to the trauma caused by Gnaeus Cornelius Sulla, who during his mandate (82-79 BC) displayed great cruelty, especially through what were called “proscriptions.” This earned him a reputation as a tyrant, as numerous senators were executed or forced into exile to protect their lives, losing properties that ended up being transferred to Sulla’s allies (Gómez Pantoja, 2003, p. 474). As a result, the Senate designed an exceptional position for Pompey by appointing him consul sine collega, allowing him to exercise power alone. It was stipulated that if he required a colleague, he could choose one at his discretion after two months from his appointment. Thus, Pompey was bound to exercise power individually during, at least, this period (Plut. Pomp. 54, 8).
These measures clearly indicate that the intention of the magistrates was to prevent Pompey from formally assuming the title of dictator. However, in this decision lies a clear lack of awareness about the irregularity of the appointment, the consul sine collega itself constituted a profound legal contradiction (Amela Valverde, 2003, p. 222). The solution was clever but illegal and senseless within the republican system. Indeed, the Senate placed the security of the state in the hands of one person, as would have been done by appointing a dictator. However, the sole consulship violated the fundamental principle of ordinary magistracies: the principle of collegiality (Pina Polo, 1999, p. 205). Dion Cassius concurs with Plutarch’s account by referring to Rome's disastrous situation and noting that this appointment was unprecedented in the history of the Republic:
"The rest of the Senate and Bibulus, who was the first consulted and declared his opinion, anticipated the enthusiasm of the people by granting the consulship to Pompey to avoid him being named dictator, and only to him so that he would not have Caesar as colleague. This action of theirs was novel, having never been taken in any other case; yet they seemed to act with good judgment" (D.C. XL, 50.)
Pompey's third consulship was a hidden dictatorship. However, despite the great similarity with the ancient magistracy, Pompey’s position differed from this in two main aspects:
- Subordination to tribunician veto: This prerogative, incorporated in the 3rd century BC, had been abolished by Sulla but was recovered after his death, precisely during one of Pompey's consulships.
- Juridical responsibility and temporality: Unlike the traditional dictator, Pompey could be judged for his actions in case of poor management. Furthermore, his magistracy was not limited to the six months customary for a dictator, allowing him to implement necessary reforms to provide a stable transition towards institutional normalcy.
During this third consulship, he presented new laws that pursued corruption and political violence with harsher penalties (Amela Valverde, 2003, p. 222). Plutarch refers to these reforms, highlighting the dignified and clean management of the consul:
"(Pompey) After attending cases of corruption and bribery, he drafted laws according to which trials would be conducted. In general, he exercised his arbitration with dignity and integrity, providing security, order, and calmness to the courts that he himself presided over accompanied by armed men" (Plut. Pomp. 55, 6)
Conclusion
The exceptional appointment of Pompey, adopted by the Senate in response to the mid-first-century BC crisis, evidences the structural exhaustion of the republican system. The need to concentrate authority in one figure demonstrates that traditional governance mechanisms had become completely obsolete for managing the complex socio-political reality of a declining Rome.
Beyond short-term success in pacifying the state, this episode underscores a profound paradox: the Republic was forced to violate its own institutional spirit to ensure its survival. By resorting to a suspension of constitutional order that granted absolute powers under the guise of an ordinary magistracy, the Senate tacitly acknowledged that the model of shared and balanced power had failed. This political maneuver represented an irreversible turning point, legitimizing the concentration of authority in one person, thus setting a dangerous precedent for personal rule.
Bibliography
Amela Valverde, L. (2003). Gnaeus Pompey Magnus: The Defender of the Roman Republic. Signifer Libros.
Dion Cassius. (2004). Roman History. Books I–XXXV, XXXVI–XLV, L–LX (D. Plácido Suárez, Trans.). Gredos.
Gómez Pantoja, J. (2003). Antiquity: Greece and Rome. Ariel.
Pina Polo, F. (1999). The Crisis of the Republic (133–44 BC). Síntesis.
Plutarch. (2007). Parallel Lives: Books V, VI, IV (J. Bergua Cavero, S. Bueno Morillo & J. M. Guzmán Hermida, Trans.). Gredos.
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